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Abstract
The aim of this article is to problematize one of the most audacious tenets of the new consen-
sus, namely the revolutionary character of fascism, by linking together the experience of the 
state of siege and the emergence of the fascist movement in interwar Romania. It tries to do so 
by drawing on the philosophical underpinnings of the paradigm of the state of exception devel-
oped by Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin’s critique of law and violence. In a first part my 
aim is to present the main arguments espoused in defending the view according to which fas-
cist movements were professing an authentic revolutionary radical politics. Secondly, I will 
turn towards legal critique and to the work of Giorgio Agamben in order to build a topography 
of the relation between law and the force of state. In a third part I will focus on the uses and the 
historical meaning of the state of siege in post-First World War Romania. This article argues 
that the emergence of the fascist movement in Romania is an event strongly embedded in the 
political, legal and symbolic dynamics entailed by the state of exception rather than the expres-
sion of a revolutionary thrust.
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Introduction
The analysis of fascism, understood primarily as a historical event disrupting 
modernity, has become under the strain of our own historical situation both 
an urgent and an uneasy task. It is a matter of urgency inasmuch as the 
traumatic, un-assumed and often unexplored debris of the fascist expe-
rience   continue to inform and limit the politico-legal potentialities of our 
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(post)modern imaginary. Exploring fascism ‘now’1 is also uneasy as the mate-
rial and ideal traces of its historical trajectory find themselves scattered 
under various layers of strategies of signification, under the interplay of the 
politics of knowledge and often unstated prejudices guiding reading and inter-
pretation.2 Added to this, the overwhelming production of often conflict-
ing historical narratives of fascism – specific to the digital age of knowledge 
production – render the subject matter uncanny, devoid of limits and ambigu-
ous, if not paradoxical. Ideological appropriations, conceptual confusions 
owing much to the martial logic of the past Cold War, polemic and rhetorical 
utterances as well as nowadays historiographical debates and philosophical 
investigations both in the field of fascism and in the field of historiography 
tend to bring the concept to the limits of its signification.
Under this novel and rather confusing historiographical landscape, order is 
slowly re-emerging. The new consensus, leaving behind time-fashioned inter-
pretations of fascism developed by the Marxist tradition on the one hand and 
traditional liberal centric theory on the other, seems to bring to the fore forgot-
ten, overlooked and often misread traits of this movement. Old paradigms of 
analysis, such as fascism as an extension of capitalism,3 or fascism qua reac-
tion to modernity4 are to be submitted to a process of re-evaluation by histori-
ans and political scientists alike. What we gain in return, is the mapping of a 
polymorphic phenomenon, which is to be understood as a part of the multiple 
experience of modernity. According to the forerunners of this trend,
fascism is a genus of modern, revolutionary, ‘mass’ politics which, while extremely hetero-
geneous in its social support and in the specific ideology promoted by its many permuta-
tions, draws its internal cohesion and driving force from a core myth that a period of 
perceived national decline and decadence is giving way to one of rebirth and renewal in a 
post-liberal new order.5
1) Any historical analysis is doubled by a negotiation between the ‘Now’ and the ‘Then’ which 
is essentially dialectical: ‘while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, con-
tinuous one, the relation of the Then to the Now is dialectical: it is not progression, but image’: 
Walter Benjamin, Arcades Project (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 462.
2) On the positive aspect of prejudice in the theory of interpretation, see Hans Georg Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989), 372-73.
3) See, e.g. : ‘[f]ascism in the eyes of capitalists is a means of saving capitalism of collapse’. 
Comintern, ‘The Terrorist Dictatorship of Finance Capital,’ in International Fascism: Theories, 
Causes and the New Consensus, ed. Roger Griffin (London: Arnold, 1998 [1933]), 59. Or, in 
Trotsky’s words: ‘fascism is a continuation of capitalism, an attempt to perpetuate its existence’. 
Leon Trotsky, ‘The counter-revolution of imperialist capitalism,’ in International Fascism: 
Theories, Causes and the New Consensus, ed. Roger Griffin (London: Arnold, 1998 [1940]), 72.
4) ‘In terms of a theory of economic growth . . . , fascism can be defined as a revolt of those who 
lost – directly or indirectly, temporarily or permanently – by industrialization. Fascism is a 
revolt of the déclassés’. Wolfgang Sauer, ‘National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?’, 
American Historical Review 73 (1967): 417.
5) Roger Griffin, ‘Introduction’, in International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New 
Consensus, ed. Roger Griffin (London: Arnold, 1998), 14. Or, in a highly synthetic vein, ‘Fascism 
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Far from being purely a reaction to the features of modern times, fascist move-
ments are to be treated by historians as pertaining to the project of modernity 
and to be understood as proposing their own alternative modern worldview,6 
albeit one built on the use of violence and the exclusion of otherness. By 
approaching the history of generic fascism through the lenses of a Weberian 
ideal type, ‘contributors to fascist studies are finally in a position to treat fas-
cism like any other political ideology rather than as a “special case”’.7 Through 
a new consensus, fascism would be analysed not only under a new light, unhin-
dered by the open ideological biases of the past, but also as a form of moder-
nity in its own right, as a virtual response to the crisis of liberal capitalism in 
the world of the interwar.8 Fascism is thus opened to be read as ‘the faulty 
diagnosis of a genuine malfunction’ pertaining to the ways in which liberal 
societies address the question of identity and belonging in times of crisis.9 In 
this sense, the new consensus between historians of fascism tries to link this 
moment to various aspects of modernity such as the cult of progress and the 
politics of time10 or the appropriation of the past to modern uses of mass 
politics.11
The semantic and conceptual negotiation between existing frameworks of 
understanding fascism and the ‘new’ emerging consensus has been in itself 
ambiguous and rather vivid.12 As such, the idea of a common core of fas-
cism  has been overtly challenged as regards its perceived essentialism,13 its 
insistence on ideology and apparent disregard of social structure and 
power organization.14 Inasmuch as an emerging discursive order organizes 
is a political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of 
populist ultra-nationalism.’ Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1993), 26. 
See also, Roger Griffin, ‘Fascim’s new faces [and new facelessness] in the post-fascist epoch,’ in 
Fascism Past and Present, West and East, ed. Roger Griffin, Werner Loh and Andreas Umland, 
(Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2006), 41.
6) ‘Fascism was everywhere an “attitude toward life”, based on a national mystique’. George 
L. Mosse, ‘Toward a General Theory of Fascism,’ in Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, 
ed. Constantin Iordachi (London: Routledge, 2010), 89.
7) Roger Griffin, ‘Introduction,’ 14.
8) Roger Griffin, ‘Modernity Under the New Order: The Fascist Project for Managing the Future’, 
in A Fascist Century, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 24-45.
9) Ibid., 44 (original emphasis).
10) Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
11) Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996); Constantin Iordachi, Charisma, Politics and Violence: The Legion of the ‘Archangel 
Michael’ in Inter-War Romania (Trondheim: PEECS, 2004).
12) For a synoptical account of the main topoi of the debate, see Roger Griffin, ‘“Consensus? 
Quel consensus?”: Perspectives pour une meilleure Entente entre les spécialistes francophones 
et anglophones du fascisme’, Vingtième siècle 108 (2010): 53-69.
13) Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 219.
14) Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12.
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knowledge and truth production, as it determines what counts as valid and 
what not, it pertains to a dimension of power. According to Foucault, ‘the pro-
duction of discourse is at the same time controlled, selected, organized and 
distributed through a certain number of procedures which have as a role to 
conjure powers and dangers, to master random events and to avoid its heavy, 
exceptional materiality’.15 As such, it is structurally determined to exclude 
what it perceives as being its other: old paradigms, approaches deemed unsci-
entific, disciplinary myths.16 However, in this process, the unorganized and 
resistant knowledge, does not fade away: ‘[k]nowledge is not an epistemologi-
cal site that disappears in the science that supersedes it’.17 Moreover, this pro-
cess of exclusion not only responds to a certain episteme,18 but also to the 
extension of the field of knowledge by the ‘entry into legibility’19 of new aspects 
of the time. What it is singled out from the ambit of the new discursive order 
risks continually haunting its project. Thus an attentive analysis of the philo-
sophical and theoretical creeds of the new historiographical approaches to fas-
cism, as well as a focus to its blind spots, can prove a useful exercise of 
constructive criticism.
The rationale underlying my project is to approach the relation between 
law and fascism at the time of the latter’s emergence on the historical stage. In 
this way, I try not only to shed a new light on the ambivalent relation between 
Romanian fascism and state-driven politics during the first decade of the 
interwar, but also to render the complex conceptual network linking Romanian 
fascism and law during modernity. My attempt relies on a critical reading of 
the law in the specific context of its enforcement as well as on a reading para-
digm which I borrow from a certain tradition of continental political philoso-
phy which has been coined as ‘radical’ inasmuch as it partakes in a style of 
reading both law and history against the grain of the various forms of our post-
political ideological consensus. Thus, my inquiry will rely conceptually on 
the work of Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin while also professing a 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’20 in the exploration of legal and historical traces. 
What detains me here is the construction of a narrative − from a legal his-
torian’s perspective − of the ways in which fascism has been entangled in the 
uses of the state of exception devised by the Romanian state during the 
interwar.
15) Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours (Paris : Gallimard, 1971), 10.
16) Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir (Paris : Gallimard, 1969), 241.
17) Ibid.
18) Ibid., 211.
19) Benjamin, Arcades Project, 463.
20) Paul Ricoeur, De l’interprétation (Paris: Le Seuil, 1965), 40-44.
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Law, violence and the state of exception
The starting point for my investigation resides in the thesis espoused by Roger 
Griffin in his seminal article ‘Exploding the Continuum of History’.21 Departing 
from the assumption specific to the new consensus scholarship that fascism 
strived to achieve a ‘radical social renewal, one rooted in the regeneration of 
the nation conceived as an organic entity and whose aim was therefore not 
mass deception and social control’,22 the article aims to open Marxist 
approaches of fascism to a more refined understanding of the fascist phenom-
ena, by debunking some of the foundational myths of the Marxist tradition. 
Synthesising his argument under the form of four ‘theses’, Griffin explores 
from an avowed non-Marxist position,23 the possibility of a dialogue between 
Marxist and non-Marxist scholars of fascism built on the basis of a new inter-
pretative model. Such a call for a renewed analysis is, of course, salutary inso-
far as approaches to fascism have been hindered by the dogma of fascism qua 
agent of capitalism and its likes as well as by econocentric functional explica-
tive models.24
In Griffin’s approach, thesis one defends the idea that ideology, acting as a 
superstructural force can operate as an ‘autonomous factor of historical causa-
tion’ that can undo or circumvent economical determinism.25 The second the-
sis asserts that ‘[i]nterwar fascism exerted a trans-class and genuinely “mass” 
appeal . . . , and contained an autonomous radical element independent of 
attempts by the forces of capitalist reaction and bourgeois self-interest to use 
it as an “agent” in its struggle against socialism’.26 Thesis three emphasizes that 
the cult of the past in fascism is ‘consistent with the crucial role of remem-
brance and mythicizing retrospection played in all revolutionary activism’.27 
For its part, the fourth and the last thesis stresses that fascism’s ‘main thrust 
is  not reactionary or conservative, but counter-revolutionary, pursuing the 
anti-conservative goal of realising a new order and a new era’.28
Thesis one could find easy acceptance in some post-Gramscian and 
post-Althusserian circles and as long as it can broaden the scope of the 
21) Roger Griffin, ‘Exploding the Continuum of History’, in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger 
Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 46-68.
22) Ibid., 52
23) Matthew Feldman, ‘The Fascination of Fascism: A Concluding Interview with Roger 
Griffin’, in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 210.
24) See, e.g., Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the 
Problem of Fascism (London: Verso, 1979).
25) Griffin, ‘Exploding the Continuum of History’, 53.
26) Ibid., 55.
27) Ibid., 57.
28) Ibid., 59 (original emphasis).
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 understanding of fascism by moving further from a simple economic under-
standing of its emergence and deployment towards a discursive one.29 One 
could certainly concede to thesis three on the grounds that not every rhetori-
cal use of the past amounts to a retrograde or conservative defence of its val-
ues. After all, was it not Marx who in the text of the law on the theft of woods 
raised his voice in ‘the defence of the customary, of what has been handed 
down through the ages against the mechanistic innovations of the juridical 
reason’?30 Could Marx have been essentially a conservative solely on these 
grounds? History abounds indeed with various appropriations of real or imag-
ined past moments in the life of polities which are called to play as a guiding 
myth for new political movements.
My attention is drawn towards the second part of thesis two stating that 
fascist movements contained a radical element which was independent of 
bourgeois and capitalist reactions attempts to capture the movements and the 
second part of thesis four defending the hypothesis that fascism’s main thrust 
was not reactionary or conservative. In sum, both of these statements propose 
reading fascist movements as structurally revolutionary ones. Very much aware 
of the cultural, intellectual, and political implications of such a thesis, the 
author is sympathetic to the existing ideological consensus – liberal and 
Marxist alike – to keep up the distinction between ‘true’ revolution and fascist 
‘revolution’, insofar as ‘to place the socialist revolution on a par with the Nazi 
revolution is not only grotesquely counterintuitive, but smacks of post- 
modern relativism, a “bourgeois luxury” lethal to any political commitment or 
radical activism’.31 Notwithstanding this political inflexion, he concludes, that 
‘such distinctions are difficult to sustain at a theoretical level.’32 That is so 
because each distinction between true and false in this case implies ‘the exist-
ence of objective criteria . . . that surely are reducible to value-judgments, or 
rather utopian constructs based on which alternative to the status quo corre-
sponds most the personal values and hopes of the historian.’33
My contention is that the analysis of the legal framework in force at the time 
of the rise of fascism as well as during fascist regimes can benefit both legal 
theorists and historians of fascism alike inasmuch as it can broaden the per-
spective of the nature and the reality of fascist movements. In this sense, I tend 
to overcome the existing disparity in the field of legal studies between positiv-
ist analysis of law under fascism and a genuine critical engagement with its 
29) But see Daniel Woodley, ‘Between Myth and Modernity: Fascism as Anti-Praxis,’ European 
Journal of Political Theory 11 (2012): 362-79, where the author finds rather problematic Griffin’s 
use of the concept of ideology.
30) Ernst Nolte, Marxism, Fascism, Cold War (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1982), 25.
31) Griffin, ‘Exploding the Continuum of History,’ 67-68.
32) Ibid., 68.
33) Ibid.
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deeper significance and legacies.34 I believe that an analysis of the legal frame-
work in place at the time of the emergence of fascist movements can be ser-
viceable as regards the trajectory of fascism. Moreover, an understanding of 
fascism as either revolutionary or conservative necessarily involves concepts 
of the state and modernity, neither of which can be thoroughly investigated 
without a discussion of legal frameworks and legal theories underpinning 
them. As fascism is a plural phenomenon, responding to local determinations 
and constraints, such are the legal frameworks and local legal histories which 
define various regimes of legality during the interwar period. It is in this sense 
that I propose an analysis of fascism in its context drawing on legal theory and 
critical philosophy.
The context of my investigation is that of the emergence of Romanian fas-
cism. Described as ‘the most unusual mass movement of interwar Europe’,35 
Romanian ultra-nationalism embodied by the Legion of Archangel Michael – 
later known as the Iron Guard – still continues to puzzle historians and politi-
cal scientists alike. Stanley Payne terms the Legion as belonging to one of the 
‘four major variants of fascism’36 as in Romania ‘fascist-type movements came 
to play an important role’.37 While stressing its particularities – such as the 
insistence of the religious tropes in the discourse it promoted – other histori-
ans would understand the Legion’s ideology as a form of ‘clerical fascism’.38 
The undeniable religious thrust of the legionary ideology prompted a historian 
such as Eugen Weber to describe this movement as essentially a reaction to 
modernity specific to a backward society.39 At a closer look, ‘the only “fascist” 
movement outside Italy and Germany to come to power without foreign 
aid’40 appears as professing a form of sacralization of politics pertaining to a 
Romanian version of modern palingenesis41 which glorified the Nation and its 
34) For a seminal example of critical analysis discussing Nazism and its legacies in the field of 
law see, David Fraser, Law After Auschwitz: Towards A Jurisprudence of the Holocaust (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2005). Symptomatic for the growing critical literature examining 
law’s connivance with authoritarianism see, Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, eds., 
Darker Legacies of Law in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). For an illuminating explora-
tion of law in the context of Italian Fascism, see Stephen Skinner, ‘Tainted Law ? The Italian 
Penal Code, Fascism and Democracy,’ International Journal of Law in Context 7 (2011): 423-46.
35) Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism: 1914-45 (London: Routledge, 1995), 279-80.
36) Ibid., 245.
37) Ibid.
38) Roger Eatwell, ‘Reflections on Fascism and Religion’, Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions 4 (2003): 146-66.
39) Eugen Weber, ‘Romania,’ in The European Right : A Historical Profile, ed. Hans Rogger and 
Eugen Weber (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), 96. See also, Eugen Weber, ‘Men of 
the Archangel,’ Journal of Contemporary History 1 (1966): 101-126, 103.
40) Weber, ‘Men of the Archangel,’ 103.
41) Constantin Iordachi, ‘God’s Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis,’ in Comparative 
Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, ed. Constantin Iordachi (London: Routledge, 2010), 320.
<UN><UN>
212 C.S. Cercel / Fascism 2 (2013) 205–233
past and identified the Jewish population as the agent of the dissolution of 
society.42
The ambiguity at the core of the fascist rhetoric of rebirth and regeneration 
through the evocation of the past is central to the Romanian fascist experience. 
For its part, the relation between conservatism and ultra-nationalism is in itself 
extremely fragile when approaching this topic.43 Furthermore, the question of 
backwardness and of reaction to modernity – two common places in any dis-
cussion of Romanian interwar realities – render this spatial-temporal arch as a 
challenging site for exploring the nexus between fascism, law and revolution.
If generic fascism emerges in the context of modernity, at the wake of the 
First World War through a ‘brutalization of public life, a routinization of vio-
lence and authoritarianism’,44 it also finds itself thrown into a specific histori-
cal moment marked by legal thought and practice. Fascism partakes in a world 
which is placed under the sign of displacement and excess, inasmuch as ‘to be 
modern is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to find one’s 
world in perpetual disintegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity 
and contradiction: to be part of a universe in which “all that is solid melts into 
air” and all that is sacred is profaned’.45 As a movement driven by a palingenetic 
ethos, ultranationalism presents itself as being a ‘panacea to anomie’.46 The 
same uneasiness of the age marks both legal thought and the daily administra-
tion of justice. Law’s ‘belated . . . encounter with modernity’ is marked by ‘the 
related legal experiences of irrationalism and powerlessness, of absurdity and 
cynicism’.47 Far from being the serene ‘system of norms’48 Kelsen imagined it 
to be, law is caught by a ‘growing apocalyptic sense’.49 The interwar is not only 
the time of revolutions, of the ‘European Civil war’, and the rise of dictator-
ships, but also the age of martial law and of the state of exception.50
42) Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe 1919-1945 (London: Routledge, 2003), 45.
43) See, e.g. Carl Levy, ‘Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914-1945: 
Issues for Comparativists,’ Contemporary European History 8 (1999): 97-126. With specific refer-
ence to Romania, see Rebecca Ann Haynes, ‘Reluctant Allies? Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Zelea 
Codreanu against King Carol II of Romania,’ The Slavonic and East European Review 85 (2007): 
105-134.
44) Payne, A History of Fascism, 79.
45) Peter Goodrich, ‘Law and Modernity,’ Modern Law Review 49 (1986): 551.
46) Griffin, ‘Modernity Under the New Order,’ 44 (original emphasis).
47) Goodrich, ‘Law and Modernity,’ 551.
48) Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 
181.
49) Goodrich, ‘Law and Modernity,’ 548.
50) Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917-1945 (Frankfurt: Herbig Verlag, 1989). As I shall 
discuss later in this article, the historical roots of martial law and of the state of exception can 
be safely traced back to late 18th century and arguably back to the ancient institutions of 
Roman public law. However, the frequence of the recourse to such measures accrued signifi-
cantly during the interwar.
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From this vantage point, it seems worth noting that European legal dis-
course in the interwar period found itself both practically and intellectually at 
the crossroads between the classic formalist paradigm and new realisms. It 
also stood at the threshold separating constitutionalism and dictatorship. 
Legal texts and doctrines of the time bear the imprint of a constant fascination 
with unregulated, pure, state power,51 with the ‘reality’ of law52 and with refer-
ences to higher or hidden values which imbue and sustain legal discourse.53 It 
is as if the world of law is re-enchanted through its relation to the sovereignty 
of the State or the mystique of the Nation.54
From the myriad of projects and dynamics in both legal thought and consti-
tutional practice, one phenomenon distinguishes itself to the extent of being 
conceptually and historically a sign of the times, that is a specific marker for a 
more overarching historical tendency in relation to law. It is the practice of 
suspending the law, the institution of martial law and the resort to government 
by decree. What we are dealing with in these distinct cases is the constant 
recourse to exceptional measures to the extent that – at least from a legal point 
of view – the age of the interwar can be coined as exceptional. As Giorgio 
Agamben writes, ‘World War One (and the years following it) appear as a labo-
ratory for testing and honing the functional mechanisms and apparatuses of 
the state of exception as a paradigm of government’.55
The state of exception is a limit-concept for legal theory inasmuch as it 
questions the basic assumptions of continental legal thought and blurs the 
pivotal distinction between the normative the and descriptive. As Agamben 
argues, ‘exceptional measures . . . find themselves in the paradoxical position 
of being juridical measures which cannot be understood in legal terms’.56 
Although the practice of the state of exception has nothing exceptional in 
itself and responds to a timely fashioned logic of unhindered state interven-
tion in times of danger, the theoretical implications of such praxis are 
extremely compelling for the legal thought and to some extent symptomatic 
for the European legal tradition. In short, the paradigm of the state of excep-
tion advanced by Agamben is a philosophical concept which builds upon the 
constitutional practice and the legal provisions existing in various modern 
constitutions consisting in either the suspension of constitutional guarantees 
51) Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994 [1921]).
52) See, Evgeny Pashukanis, ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism,’ in Selected Writings on 
Marxism and Law, ed. Piers Beirne and Robert Shalet (London: Academic Press, 1980 [1924]), 
37-132.
53) Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2004 [1914]).
54) Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 [1922]).
55) Giorgio Agamben, State of exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 [2003]), 7.
56) Ibid., 1.
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or of the whole constitutional process for a series of actions taken by state 
authorities with the aim of protecting the constitutional order.
To be sure, this interpretative paradigm could have benefitted greatly from 
a broader historical and comparative basis insofar as the philosophical insights 
Agamben draws from the presupposed logic at the core of the state of excep-
tion hastily link modern legal frameworks to their alleged Roman roots.57 
However, the reading he proposes is poignant as a tool of social semiotics and 
as an exercise in legal philosophy. Drawing on Schmitt’s concept of 
Ausnahmezustand [state of exception],58 Agamben isolates the state of excep-
tion as a zone of indistinction in the structure of the law,59 a conceptual area 
where it is logically impossible to make any relevant distinction between law 
(as a normative category) and fact (as a descriptive one). It is through this ‘sus-
pension’ of the legal, that a zone of indistinction between fact and norm, 
between force and form, is brought upon social reality. As he writes, following 
Schmitt, ‘[s]ince “there is no rule that is applicable to chaos”, chaos must first 
be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of indistinc-
tion between outside and inside, chaos and the normal situation — the state 
of exception’.60 Any attempt at reasoning the state of exception as either a 
state inside or outside the sphere of the law fails. Do such legal measures fall 
under the category of legally or constitutionally justified measures? Are they 
purely and simply facts creating their own legitimacy, or are they legitimized a 
posteriori by the return to normalcy?
In this sense, the suspension of the law blurs the borders between the stabil-
ity attributed to legal normativity and its exterior: ‘[T]he situation created in 
the exception has the peculiar characteristic that it cannot be defined either as 
a situation of fact or as a situation of right’.61 The paradox entailed by the state 
of exception is not a case of a mere lacuna in the law — pursuant to which 
the judge would have had to intervene in order to render the legal norm 
enforceable — but purely and simply the status of the legal order. This way the 
law presents itself precisely ‘as if the juridical order [il diritto] contained an 
essential fracture between the position of the norm and its application, which 
. . . can be filled only . . . by creating a zone in which application is suspended 
but the law [la legge], as such, remains in force’.62 In other words, in order to be 
effective the legal order has to be suspended for in itself it is pure normativity, 
estranged from life. In as much as law is to regulate and discipline reality, it has 
57) Ibid., 41.
58) Schmitt, Political Theology, 5.
59) Agamben, State of exception, 41.
60) Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998[1995]), 19.
61) Ibid.
62) Agamben, State of exception, 31.
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to include (by excluding) the bare, unregulated life of the subjects it domi-
nates. Now, this inclusion of life is possible only by presupposing an outside of 
the law, a state of lawlessness that precedes and renders it conceivable, an out-
side awaiting to be colonized: ‘[L]aw is made of nothing but what it manages 
to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the exceptio: it nour-
ishes itself on this exception and is a dead letter without it’.63
It should not be surprising that this ambiguity of traditional constitutional 
theory was one of the first targets to find itself under the attack of the counter-
revolutionary legal thought. Indeed, for Schmitt, the mere existence of such an 
area at the very core of the law, not only underlines the fragility of the constitu-
tion, but also questions its primacy. In other words, what stays fundamental in 
the fundamental law as long as its structure is grounded ultimately on recourse 
to a force which is in itself unregulated? Accordingly a legal norm cannot be 
conceived without presupposing the existence of a normal situation: ‘[E]very 
general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be 
applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homo-
geneous medium’.64 Simply put, ‘for a legal order to make sense, a normal situ-
ation must exist’.65 From this point of view, the place of sovereignty can be 
located in the act of deciding upon the existence of the normal situation. 
Otherwise said, the fundamental norm is itself subsequent to an act of deci-
sion of the sovereign.66
Through the state of exception one would get a glimpse of the force of law67 
which permeates and sustains legal discourse, of the ‘the force essentially 
implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes 
“droit”, of the law as “droit”’.68 Consequently, law appears as a medium which is 
pervasive to state power, which does not control it, rather it is controlled by it. 
At this juncture, Walter Benjamin’s insights into the relation between law and 
violence seem illuminating inasmuch as they shed a new light on the inner 
constituents of law. In a text which was to become the standard reference in 
legal critique, Benjamin exposes – in a deconstructionist move – law’s histori-
cal dependence on violence. Benjamin’s exemplary exercise in relating law, 
aesthetics, theology, and philosophical criticism is also symptomatic for a his-
torical moment where revolutionary and reactionary violence as well as state 
of exception were a common presence in Europe. According to his reading, 
63) Agamben, Homo Sacer, 27.
64) Schmitt, Political Theology, 13.
65) Ibid.
66) ‘He is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists’. Ibid.
67) For a thorough analysis of the concept, see Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: “The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority”,’ in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, 
Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (London: Routledge, 1992), 3-67.
68) Ibid., 5.
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law’s relation to violence is twofold as the function of violence is either ‘law-
making’ or ‘law-preserving’.69 Owing to a tradition of Marxist legal pessimism, 
Benjamin argues that historically law is marked by its complicity with power.70
As he writes, ‘[A]ll law was the prerogative of the kings or of the nobles – in 
short of the mighty; and that, mutatis mutandis, will remain as long as it 
exists.’71 By its complicity to the established – to the already-there and always-
to-be-there – forms of domination, law is related to fate and to myth: ‘violence 
crowned by fate is the origin of the law’.72 The core of the law, is thus to be 
sought ‘where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal 
system’.73 Law and mythical violence, as forms of the established status quo 
converge in closing the sphere of human agency. Thus, ‘the mythical manifes-
tation of immediate violence shows itself identical with all legal violence, and 
turns suspicion concerning the latter into certainty of the perniciousness of its 
historical function’.74 Law is thus tainted by being weaved into the fabric of 
myth, of the preserving power which ‘demands sacrifice’.75 To this malevolent 
instance of law and violence, Benjamin opposes ‘divine violence’, which is 
‘law-destroying’, and disrupts the power of myth: ‘if mythical violence brings at 
once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates’.76 Benjamin’s critique 
of violence compels us to acknowledge the tension between law – understood 
as a formalized practice of repetition of a mythical foundational violence – 
and the authentic event of revolutionary ‘divine violence’. Thus it opens the 
possibility of distinguishing between mere re-assertions of power and the 
advent of radically new regimes of being together.
The state of exception and the critique of violence point together to an 
‘other dimension of law’,77 one which has been constantly either disregarded 
or occulted by traditional jurisprudence, insofar as it sought to imagine the law 
as a system of rules of conduct which could be easily interpreted or opened to 
scientific analysis.78 They also trace back to a historical moment when law’s 
relation to violence became ubiquitous. From the standpoint of a history of 
forms of legal thought, what is at stake here, is not precisely ‘the breakdown of 
69) Walter Benjamin ‘Critique of Violence’ (1921), in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, ed. Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 285.
70) See Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970 [1843]).
71) Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, 296.
72) Ibid., 286.
73) Ibid.
74) Ibid., 296.
75) Ibid., 297.
76) Ibid.
77) Pierre Legendre, ‘The Other Dimension of Law,’ Cardozo Law Review 16 (1995): 950.
78) Peter Goodrich, ‘The Rise of Legal Formalism: Or the Defenses of Legal Faith,’ Legal Studies 
3 (1983): 254.
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constitutional democracy’ specific to the interwar – as political scientists and 
historians hastened to argue – but the very possibility for legal discourse to 
articulate itself.79 Indeed, what the state of exception and Benjamin’s critique 
of violence bring to the fore is the impossibility of the normative to take hold 
over political reality and violence. Thus, exploring empirically the dissolution 
of the law specific to the state of exception, with and against the paradigms 
and their subjacent legal ontologies proposed by Agamben pace Schmitt and 
by Benjamin, could shed a new light over the cartography of fascism. The ques-
tion to be sought is, to which extent did a fascist movement related to the state 
of exception, in which ways could its position be regarded as ‘law-preserving’ 
or ‘law-destroying’, to borrow Benjamin’s terms? Moreover, how did the sus-
pension of the law affect the symbolic structure of the polity at the advent of 
fascism? If the law has been ‘reef on which the revolutions . . . have been ship-
wrecked’,80 what is to be made of the palingenetic thrust of fascist movements 
in contact with the law? In what follows, I shall try to sketch a possible answer 
to these questions by examining the case of Romanian fascism in relation to 
the politico-legal context of its emergence.
Legality under siege
In 1919, in a contribution addressed to the Society for Comparative Legislation 
on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, Constantin Disescu – Dissesco, by 
his Francized name and equally a prominent Romanian constitutionalist of 
the time – intervened on the topic of the evolutions Romanian public law has 
faced ever since Eduard Lambert’s founding of the Society. In his rather hasty 
and heterogeneous analysis of Romanian constitutionalism encompassing 
five decades of politico-legal practice, the noted professor insisted on a some-
what peculiar aspect, namely the practice of government by decree which he 
considered to be a consequence of the war. As he wrote, ‘more important, 
more intense [than everything else] has been the influence that the world war 
which started in 1914 had on Romanian public law.’81
Accordingly, one can trace back to the war-time legal practice ‘the evolution 
of the authority of the government entailed by the conferred right to declare 
the partial or general state of siege, the transfer of certain judicial attributions 
from the judiciary to martial courts, the extension of Military Authorities’ 
79) Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 137.
80) Agamben, Homo Sacer, 14.
81) Constantin Dissesco, ‘L’évolution du droit public roumain,’ in Les transformations du droit 
dans les principaux pays depuis cinquante ans: livre du cinquantenaire de la Société de législation 
comparée (Paris : L.G.D.J, 1922), 301.
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powers, of the law of the state of necessity owing to which the government 
could suspend, abrogate or create laws by decree.’82 He then continues in an 
almost divinatory manner: ‘[I]t is there, one has to confess it, not the evolution 
of the law, but the possibility of its suspension’.83 From this standpoint, ‘the 
dire situation which arises, is the change of meaning of the famous word: legal-
ity’.84 In order to make his argument clearer in the eyes of the French speaking 
reader, the author underlines: ‘one has to say it openly: it [i.e. legality] is some-
thing else after the German aggression.’85
It is not by mere coincidence that the Romanian constitutionalist was shar-
ing his worries about the future of legality in Romania to his French-speaking 
peers. Not only was French the language of law in Romania since the middle of 
19th century, but also the mechanisms of its suspension were also of French 
origin. At the time when Disescu was writing his intervention, Romania was 
still under the state of siege declared in 191686 and restated by a Royal Decree 
in 1918.87 Both acts which served as a legal basis for the institution of the state 
of siege referred to the conditions and limits prescribed by a Statute adopted 
in 1864 by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza.88 The latter statute was itself a restate-
ment of an original appendix of the Military Code of Justice introduced in 
1852,89 which translated into Romanian the French Statute on the State of 
siege of 1849.90
Indeed, the legal origins of the state of siege in Romania are to be sought in 
the tremendous work of legal translation and transplantation steered by the 
state and the elites in the enthusiastic and unfinished process of moderniza-
tion of the nineteenth century. Interestingly enough, the legal mechanisms of 
suspending the law had been imported even before the country had a formal 
constitution, as the first modern constitution was adopted in 1866. Moreover, 
Romanian legal scholarship of the interwar years refers quite unambiguously 
to the legal concept of the state of siege as originating in the French revolution 
itself.91 The ur-type juridical instantiation of the state of siege is provided by 
the French statute of 1791 which states in its article 10 that
82) Ibid.
83) Ibid.
84) Ibid. (emphasis added).
85) Ibid.
86) Decret Regal pentru starea de asediu [Royal Decree concerning the State of Siege] No. 2798, 
M. Of., No. 107, 16 August 1916, 47.
87) Decret Regal [Royal Decree] No. 1626, M. Of., No.79 bis, 1 July 1918, 23.
88) ‘Lege pentru starea de asediu din 10 decembrie 1864’ [Statute for the State of Siege of the 
10th of December 1864], in V. Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu: doctrină, jurisprudență și 
legislație (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1939), 30-31.
89) Dumitru Popescu, Regimul juridic al stării de asediu (Iași: Institutul de Arte Grafice 
Alexandru Terek, 1942), 28.
90) Loi du 9 août 1849 sur l’Etat de siège, Bulletin des lois, no. 186, 146.
91) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 6; Popescu, Regimul juridic, 28-30.
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in fortifications and military outposts, once these places and posts are under a state of 
siege, all the authority which the civil servants have been vested with by the constitution, 
for maintaining internal order and policing, shall be passed onto the military commander 
who will exercise them exclusively under his own sole responsibility.92
A subsequent statute of 1797 would extend the sphere of application of the 
state of siege from fortified positions and military posts to communes and 
towns inside the state’s territory.93 After the fall of the Empire, the use of the 
state of siege during the June Rebellion of 1832 by Louis-Philippe would spark 
much controversy, as the Cour de Cassation would refuse to recognize the 
royal ordinance declaring it as constitutional.94 The statute of 1849, which 
would serve as a basis for the Romanian first legislation in the field, moves 
further in regulating and defining the state of siege. Accordingly, the state of 
siege can be declared in the case of imminent danger, irrespective of the situ-
ation of the region and the existence of a military position in its area, as well as 
irrespective of the nature of the threat, which can be either internal or exter-
nal.95 Hence the literature distinguishes between a ‘fictitious’ state of siege 
which is instituted as a result of a politico-legal enactment, and ‘real’ military 
siege specific to the original legislation of 1791.96 During the state of siege civil 
authorities pass attributions related to the administration of justice and law 
enforcement to the military ones.97 Consequently, military tribunals are enti-
tled to judge crimes against public order and the constitution regardless of the 
status of the defendants.98 The army is authorised to carry out searches during 
night or day, to expel from the area former convicts and persons without a 
legal residence therein, and to prohibit press publications or any reunion it 
may judge necessary.99 In all other matters citizens continue to keep their 
constitutional guarantees.100
The Romanian Statute for the state of siege of 10 December 1864 translates 
the content of the French version even as to detail. What we are dealing 
with, in the Romanian case, is once again the transfer of order maintaining 
92) ‘Loi du 10 juillet 1791 sur la conservation et le classement des places de guerre et postes 
militaires,’ in Bulletin des lois depuis le mois du juin 1789 jusqu’au mois d’août 1830, Vol. II (Paris : 
Paul Dupont, 1834), 235.
93) Loi du 10 fructidor an V (27 août 1797) qui détermine la manière dont les communes de 
l’intérieur de la République pourront être mises en état de guerre ou de siège, Bulletin des lois, 
No. 1380, 14-15.
94) Théodore Reinach, De l’état de siège: étude juridique et historique (Paris : F. Pichon, 1885), 
101.
95) Louis-Joseph Gabriel de Chénier, De l’État de siège, de son utilité et de ses effets (Paris : 
Librairie Militaire de J. Dumaine, 1849), 27-31.
96) Reinach, De l’état de siège, 99.
97) Loi du 9 août 1849 sur l’Etat de siège, art. 7, 146.
98) Ibid., art. 8, 146.
99) Ibid., art. 9, 146.
100) Ibid., art. 11, 146.
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attributions from civil authorities to the military ones. Through the state of 
siege, the military authority has the right to proceed with searches ‘whenever 
and wherever it will be deemed necessary’, it is entitled to expel the same cat-
egories of persons described above, as well as to withhold the publications and 
prohibit assemblies which it ‘esteems to have the nature of inciting or support-
ing disorder’.101 Military tribunals are equally granted jurisdiction over crimes 
against state security, crimes against the Constitution, and against public 
order.102 The law also states that all other constitutional rights which are not 
suspended through the state of siege, shall continue to be exercised by citi-
zens.103 The apparent similarities fall short with respect to the legal authority 
entitled to declare the state of siege. Whereas the French legislation in its orig-
inal form of 1849 set as a principle that only the National Assembly had the 
right to declare the state of siege, the Romanian law granted this right to the 
Prince.104 Moreover, when the French law was adopted pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Constitution – albeit in a time of revolutionary turmoil – the 
Romanian legislation was passed after the coup d’Etat orchestrated by Prince 
Cuza.105
After the adoption of the Constitution of 1866, the validity of the statute was 
questioned as it conflicted with the prohibition of exceptional tribunals as 
well as with the prohibition against suspending the constitution.106 However, 
during the war of 1877, the state of siege would be declared in the counties 
neighbouring the Danube, without further justification.107 Before the First 
World War, the recourse to the state of siege would stay within the limits of an 
exceptional measure. Indeed, one can find the state of siege only during the 
peasant uprising of 1907 and the conflict with Bulgaria in 1913,108 whereas 
between 1916 and 1933 there would be issued no less than thirteen decrees 
instituting, restating, extending, upholding or raising the state of siege.109
From this short historical excursus it should become apparent that things 
are rather more complex than the legal texts would present them. Not only 
does the state of siege originate historically in the intricate politico-legal situ-
ation of the French revolution, and not only have its uses before the First World 
War been considered problematic in France and Romania alike, but also the 
very concept links together the martial logic to the functioning of the state.
101) ‘Lege pentru starea de asediu din 10 decembrie 1864’, art. 6, 30-31
102) Ibid., art. 5, 30.
103) Ibid., art. 7, 31.
104) Ibid., art. 2, 30.
105) Popescu, Regimul juridic, 30-31.
106) Ibid., 31.
107) Ibid.
108) Ibid.
109) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 32-45.
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The legal provisions dating from 1791 relate to the state territory in purely 
military strategic terms as the statute ostensibly applies to places de guerre 
[fortifications] and to military posts. Moreover, the enactment of the state of 
siege is not primarily the result of a politico-legal decision, but a decision 
 subsequent to a military evaluation of the situation of being under a siege.110 
In its original form of the statute of 1791, ‘the state of siege was not activated 
either by the King, or by the legislator, but by the very facts of the situation, 
namely from the moment that there was an actual attack from the enemy.’111
Through the subsequent legislation, up until its Romanian form, one con-
tinues to find a mixture of military jargon and legal concepts, which limit the 
possibility of legal regulation. It is thus symptomatic, that in French legal doc-
trine the authorities’ actions of declaring the state of siege fall in the category 
of the ‘administrative arbitrary’.112 They are ‘acts of government’,113 which can-
not be controlled by the courts of law.114 Thus, the state of siege reopens the 
exercise of power specific to the ancien régime, which is more apparent in the 
Romanian case as the state of siege is a prerogative of the Prince – and later on 
of the King.115 Moreover, the state of siege presents itself as an ambiguous con-
cept which traces back to the legal categories of war and peace. As one of the 
commentators of the law of 1849 noted, the state of siege finds itself at the 
threshold between the state of peace and the state of war as ‘civil and military 
authorities must coordinate themselves in anything that can be deemed nec-
essary for the preservation of public order’.116
The wording of the legal provisions and the choice of concepts are not 
entirely neutral and are founded on a series of ideological assumptions which 
are part of the wider philosophical network of modernity. Therefore, one 
should be attentive to the relation the state of siege produces between state, 
territory, population and sovereignty. The gradual move from a limited area, 
which found itself in what we would call today a conflict zone towards other 
areas which were to be considered through the power of the legal fiction anal-
ogous in terms of danger and threat to the structure of the state, puts into 
question both military and legal theory. Through the state of siege, not only 
military positions would be submerged to the authority of the army, but also 
110) Loi du 10 juillet 1791 sur la conservation et le classement des places de guerre et postes mili-
taires, art. 1, 235.
111) Anna-Lena Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human Rights and States of 
Exception (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 37 [original emphasis].
112) Jean Cruet, Etude juridique de l’arbitraire gouvernamental et administratif (Paris: Librairie 
nouvelle de droit et de jurisprudence, 1906), 158.
113) Ibid., 232
114) Ibid. See also, Edouard Laferrière, Traité de la juridiction administrative et des recours con-
tentieux, 2nd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1896), 36.
115) Popescu, Regimul juridic, 30.
116) De Chénier, De l’État de siège, 16.
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zones which are liable to foster imminent danger to the state. Accordingly, ter-
ritorial as well as normative distinctions between war and peace are dissolved, 
as virtually the whole state can be considered as being a war zone. Moreover, 
the symbolic limits between state as a legal construct and state as a military 
entity are also blurred insofar as under the general state of siege the whole ter-
ritory becomes a fortification, a place de guerre.
As a judgment of the Romanian Curtea de Casaţie [Supreme Court] of 1925 
suggests, the partial state of siege raises specific issues in relating legality and 
territory by creating grey zones of action for the executive.117 As such, can a 
person in proximity of a zone under the state of siege be arrested for being part 
of a meeting deemed dangerous by the military authorities of that zone?118 
Where is the line to be drawn between what is inside and outside the area 
under the state of siege? Even if the highest court decided that police and judi-
ciary activities exercised by military authorities are strictly confined to the 
area under state of siege, the very fact of this decision bears witness to an exist-
ing legal uncertainty brought by the recourse to this type of measures. But not 
only space is to be reframed under the state of siege. As the article granting the 
military authorities the right to judge crimes against the state or the constitu-
tion is regarded by the interpretative community as containing ‘rules of pro-
cedure’,119 they can be exerted retroactively without any constitutional 
impediment.120 Thus, time itself falls under the ambit of the state of siege. For 
as long as the state of siege is a rule of procedure, it can be applied to crimes 
perpetrated before its enactment.
Another distinction which is questioned by the state of siege has been 
pointed out ever since its beginnings in the early modern landscape of post-
revolutionary France. In the case of Sieur Geoffroy, the French Cour de Cassation 
would consider the judgments made by a military court unconstitutional, as 
such courts could not have jurisdiction over civilians.121 The law of 1849 would 
clarify this issue, by stating that during the state of siege military Courts have 
full authority to judge crimes given into their jurisdiction ‘regardless of the 
quality of the defendants’.122 This view relies very much on the argument 
advanced by conservatives back in 1832 against the Court, holding that once a 
citizen takes up arms against the state they become de facto military and 
should be tried as such.123 Consequently, the state of siege blurs the traditional 
117) Curtea de Casaţie (Sectia II), 25 February 1925, Buletinul Casației, 1925, 369-75.
118) Ibid., 371. See also Popescu, Regimul juridic, 56-57.
119) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 21.
120) Ibid. See also Ioan Tanoviceanu, Tratat de drept penal și procedură penală, 2nd ed., Vol. I 
(Bucharest: Curierul Judiciar, 1924), 286.
121) Cour de Cassation, 29 June 1832, Journal du Palais, Vol. 24, 1841, 1219-23.
122) Loi du 9 août 1849 sur l’Etat de siège, art. 8, 146.
123) Auguste M. Barthelemy, Justification de l’état de siège (Paris : Felix Locquin, 1832), 25.
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distinction between military and non-military. To the eyes of the law under 
the state of exception, any citizen becomes a potential military threat which 
can be searched, prevented to participate in reunions, censored or expelled 
according to the decision of the military authorities.
The state of siege is disruptive in the sense that it restates the arbitrary 
inherent to assertions of sovereignty which modern law strived to rationalize. 
In the Romanian context of the interwar, it takes the most prosaic form as long 
as the Curtea de Casaţie declared that the act of instituting the state of siege is 
outside its jurisdiction and thus cannot be made the object of a legal assess-
ment.124 As an act of government, the state of siege reasserts the sovereign 
right specific of the traditional regimes of power in the framework of modern 
legality. At a closer look, the state of siege appears as a crack in the system of 
formalization that law is called to bring onto political power. By effacing the 
basic distinctions which make legal discourse appear rational, the state of 
siege links together space, time and population under the power of a state 
which is reduced to its military form.
It is in this sense that the state of siege can be perceived as a historical 
instantiation of the generic concept of the ‘state of exception’. As the law sus-
pends itself through its paradoxical self-referentiality − and it does so by means 
of a legal norm − the state of siege blurs the distinction between fact and norm 
by bringing to the fore the unregulated force of the state in its military guise. 
Furthermore, the state of siege dissolves also the basic legal categories of law 
enforcement by distorting spatial, temporal and personal landmarks of the 
application of norms. As such, it partakes into the general ‘sense-making cri-
sis’125 of the interwar, by mixing together remnants of legal authority and mili-
tary tactics.
Revolution within the limits of the law
The Royal Decree of August 14 1916 declared the state of siege over the whole 
territory of the country, having as a legal basis the law of 1864. It would stay in 
force until June 30 1918, when its provisions would be restated by another Royal 
Decree. Romanian participation in the First World War is, of course, the main 
reason underlying the use of the state of siege. But even after the Treaty of 
Bucharest, in March 1918, the state of siege would be held up until 1920, when 
124) Curtea de Casaţie, 20 February 1921, Pandectele Române, 1922, 58. See also Pantelimonescu, 
Starea de asediu, 17.
125) Gerald M. Platt, ‘An Alternative Theory,’ in International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the 
New Consensus, ed. Roger Griffin (London: Arnold, 1998 [1980]), 208.
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it was reintroduced the same year.126 The end of the First World War brought 
Romania not only a series of successful albeit uneasy negotiations at 
Versailles,127 but also a whole variety of new conflicts ranging from the partici-
pation in quelling the Bolshevik revolution in Hungary in 1919128 to a constant 
cold conflict at the borders with the Soviet Union.129
To this experience of war as well as to the perceived external threat existent 
at the time one may trace back the origins of the constant recourse to the state 
of siege and a silent insinuation of a martial logic in the politico-juridical life. 
As it has been noted, the state of siege was a common presence in some parts 
of the newly acquired territories: ‘Bessarabia has been under martial law ever 
since the annexation, with censorship and all other forms of government 
interference with normal life’.130 But before becoming common currency in 
dealing with internal or external threat and subversion, the mechanisms of the 
state of siege became the Romanian answer to the October revolution. 
Witnessing the manifold range of problems raised by the presence on the ter-
ritory of a Russian army close to one million, in early 1918 Romanian reaction 
was to resort to martial measures specific to the state of siege already in force:
The Romanian High Command immediately set Romanian reserves behind the portions 
of the front still held by Russian troops; they greatly strengthened the state police (gen-
darmes); they divided Moldavia up into military districts, each of which was entrusted to 
a military unit; every infraction of the regulations of the High Command was severely 
punished; no Russian troops, even unarmed, might approach Jassy; none might leave the 
front or return to Russia without surrendering their arms.131
But harsh measures under the strain of necessity and of the state of siege were 
not only directed against external threats. The Decree of 1920 declaring the 
state of siege ‘over the territory of the stronghold of Bucharest’132 was directed 
against internal subversion. As the President of the Council of Ministries wrote 
in his official report to the King, ‘the general strike…created in the country a 
more dangerous situation as the state of peace is not yet established between 
Romanians and our neighbours’.133 The general strike opposing Romanian 
126) Decret Regal pentru declararea stării de asediu în Bucureşti şi instituirea cenzurei [Royal 
decree declaring the state of siege in Bucharest and instituting censorship] No. 4209, M. Of., 
No. 159, 21 October 1920, 1.
127) Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 288-91.
128) Ibid., 286-87. See also, Charles Upson Clark, United Roumania (New York: Dodd, Mead and 
Co., 1932), 197-215.
129) Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia, Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea (New York : Dodd, 
Mead & Co., 1927), 223-31.
130) Ibid., 261.
131) Clark, United Roumania, 173.
132) Decret Regal pentru declararea stării de asediu în Bucureşti şi instituirea cenzurei, art. 1, 1.
133) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 37.
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socialists and the government started on the twentieth of October and would 
be quelled by the twenty-ninth. The government refused to recognize both the 
legality and the legitimacy of the movement while significantly labelling it as 
being ‘a revolutionary strike which does not ground itself on professional 
demands’.134 The same report addressed to the King stated that the ‘strike is 
organized by subversive machinations and the professional demands are only 
pretexts which seek only through destabilizing the work, to threaten the stabil-
ity of the state’.135 A French anonymous reviewer of the Romanian press of the 
time concluded that as a consequence of the state of siege ‘a scission took 
place inside the trade unions’.136 As such, ‘the moderate elements separated 
themselves from extremists and group themselves in national unions. This 
movement, started in the Old Kingdom, especially in Iași, spread rapidly in the 
new provinces, particularly in Transylvania, where it gains considerable 
ground’.137
In March 1921, another decree declared the state of siege on all the western, 
northern and eastern borders, on an area ranging from thirty up to fifty kilo-
metres.138 In January 1923, just two months before the adoption of the new 
constitution, the state of siege was extended in Transylvania, covering a wide 
range of its western parts.139 It was also extended in October 1924 to the south-
ern part of Bessarabia140 as a response to the Tatar Bunary uprising,141 in 1925 
in the district of Putna in Northern Romania and in 1926 in the Cadrilater.142 
The state of siege was finally suspended in all districts inside the country in 
November 1928, only to be restated in 1933.143
For its part, the Romanian Constitution of 1923 introduced a reference to 
the state of siege in its article 128. In a highly ambiguous formulation, it is thus 
stated that ‘the Constitution cannot be suspended either entirely or par-
tially’.144 However, the same article decrees that ‘in case of a danger to the 
134) ‘La situation gouvernementale. L’agitation socialiste,’ in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 
Bulletin périodique de la presse roumaine : du 11 septembre au 31 décembre 1920, no. 30, 12 February 
1921, 10.
135) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 38.
136) ‘La situation gouvernementale. L’agitation socialiste,’ 10.
137) Ibid.
138) Decret Regal pentru declararea stării de asediu de asediu la frontieră [Royal decree declar-
ing the state of siege in the border regions] No. 853, in M. Of. , No. 286, 31 March 1921, 12.
139) Decret Regal referitor la lărgirea stării de asediu din Ardeal [Royal decree concerning the 
extension of the state of siege in Transylvania] No. 131, in M. Of., No. 231, 26 January 1923, 15.
140) Decret Regal relativ la extinderea stării de asediu în sudul Basarabiei [Royal decree con-
cerning the extension of the state of siege in Southern Bessarabia] No. 3310, in M.Of., No. 219, 
7 October 1924, 7.
141) Clark, Bessarabia, Russia and Roumania, 223-31.
142) Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu, 42-43
143) Ibid., 44-45
144) The Constitution of Romania, M. Of., No. 282, 29 March, 1923, art. 128, 5.
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State, a general or partial state of siege can be instituted through law’.145 In this 
article we witness in nuce the mark of the state of exception, that of being a 
paradoxical legal structure which is founded on an ‘inclusive exclusion . . . 
which serves to include what is excluded’.146 Indeed, the state of siege is 
excluded from the ambit of the constitution, given that its practice is norma-
tively discordant with the constitutional framework. For in order for the other 
articles guaranteeing both political and civil rights to be true, the possibility of 
suspension of the constitution has to be negated. However, the next phrase re- 
introduces the state of siege as a practice which is regulated by the law and 
therefore by the constitution itself. But, as I tried to show before, the state of 
siege necessarily produces a break in the constitutional system, be it only 
through the mere fact that civil authorities’ attributions are passed onto the 
military and freedom of expression and reunion are suspended. Note how the 
state of siege can be equated once again to the state of exception. The norma-
tive validity of the constitution is not negated, while in the same time, the 
constitution can virtually be rendered devoid of content. The law is there, in 
the pure sphere of the normative, while in the real life its application is vested 
in the form of pure military intervention.
The presence of the military in the political life of the time cannot be disre-
garded. Following the world war, figures such as General Coandă, General 
Văitoianu and not least General Averescu, held during the 1920s important 
offices in the government, acting either as prime-ministers, ministers of 
Foreign affairs or ministers of the Interior.147 It will thus not be hazardous to 
remark that the legal state of siege was moulded with a constant military rhet-
oric and an overall increase of authoritarian politics. In this sense, Romania 
was not an isolated case, inasmuch as the end of the First World War brought 
with it the shift towards authoritarianism and an advent of political violence. 
As Stanley Payne observes, in the wake of the War ‘the basic habits of politics 
were altered, as the secular trend toward liberal democracy and greater repre-
sentative government was challenged and in some areas reversed. The conse-
quence was a brutalization of political life which made the recourse to political 
violence seem natural and even normal’.148
The incipient forms of organization of the Romanian fascist movement 
were strongly connected to the strikes of 1920, the use of the state of siege as 
well as the overall perception of time out of joint. As the founder of the Iron 
Guard, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu would note in his propaganda material, 
145) Ibid.
146) Agamben, Homo Sacer, 20.
147) Clark, United Romania, 316-17 ; Zigu Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen 
Thirties (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 7-75.
148) Payne, A History of Fascism, 71.
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For my legionnaires: ‘there was a state of chaos in the country at that time . . . 
that we understood very well’.149 Rebecca Haynes observes, ‘strikes reached a 
peak in 1920, when there were 750 strikes, 112 in Bucharest alone’.150 Moreover, 
the Senate plot in December of the same year – in which the minister of Justice 
and a member of the senate were dead and former prime-minister, general 
Coandă, was gravely wounded – definitely escalated the general state of uncer-
tainty.151 It is in this sense that the birth of the fascist movement – even in the 
form of a ‘distinct sub-type’152 of fascism such as the later Iron Guard proved to 
be – is to be traced to this period of time placed under the aegis of the excep-
tion and violence. Not only had the ultranationalist militants actively took part 
in strike breaking actions, but they would also organize themselves in a form 
of a radical group called the Guard of National Awareness which in its short 
life programmatically opposed international communism. Furthermore, their 
incipient actions took place in the confused legal situation created by the 
enactment of the state of siege.
The ideology of the Legion of the Archangel Michael also played a crucial 
role in practicing, advocating and exerting political violence, and in the time to 
follow, the movement became one of its main agents. The Legion moved from 
the support of the state as a vigilante anti-revolutionary organization to the 
overt opposition of state power as an anti-establishment movement, in order 
to end up as one of the main forces of the National-Legionary State in its short 
shot-gun marriage with the conservative authoritarian Marshall Antonescu. 
Consequently, in relation to the state of exception, the Legion would be suc-
cessively, one of its agents, one of its objects, and finally one of its subjects.
As Constantin Iordachi points out in his exemplary study of the Iron Guard, 
Romanian fascism has been mistakenly linked to Orthodox Christianity and 
mysticism. Rather, its intellectual roots are to be sought in a specific form of 
Romanian palingenesis which stems from the romantic cultural mythology 
of national regeneration as well as from the sacralization of politics.153 The 
Legion appears as a modern product, one which may be wielding an anti- 
modern rhetoric, but which is intrinsically related to the project of modernity 
of the nineteenth century. To be sure, as Iordachi rightly points  out, the 
main leader of the Legion, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu ‘did not implement major 
149) Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Pentru legionari (Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936), 4.
150) Rebecca Haynes, ‘Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian “New Man”,’ in In the Shadow 
of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Rebecca Haynes and 
Martyn Rady (London: Tauris, 2011), 171.
151) Ibid.
152) Stanley Payne, ‘The NDH State in Comparative Perspective,’ Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 7 (2006): 411.
153) Constantin Iordachi, ‘God’s Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis,’ in Comparative 
Fascist Studies: New Perspectives, ed. Constantin Iordachi (London: Routledge, 2010), 320-321.
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innovations to the Romantic doctrine of messianic nationalism’.154 Rather, the 
movement and its ideology were built upon a series of topoi widely spread in 
Romanian culture as
most of the elements of the Legionary palingenetic ideology had been elaborated in the 
pre-World War I namely the idea of rebirth and regeneration, its codification in the cult of 
Michael the Brave and his patron saint, the Archangel Michael, the cult of the martyrs, 
fear of degeneration and rabid Anti-Semitism, and the central role assigned to the army 
and the values of militarism in the regeneration of the nation.155
Indeed, the leader of the fascist movement boasted of the military education 
he had received in one of Romania’s elite military schools near the Monastery 
of Dealu Mare.156 He saw himself as a man of arms and the movement would 
be fashioned as to having all the appearance of a military force both in terms 
of discipline and military ethos.157 Thus, it is worth noting that Codreanu was 
addressed to – in its quality of the leader of the movement – as Capitanul [The 
Captain]. More important seems to be not only Codreanu’s military back-
ground but also the whole process of militarization Romania underwent as a 
modern state and which − not surprisingly – can be traced to the same series 
of measures in which originated the legislation of 1864 concerning the state 
of siege.158 Accordingly, Romanian citizens were to be not only drafted in 
times of war, but also military training would be organized for non-drafted 
citizens.159
Codreanu was not only trained as a military man. Significantly enough for 
the aim of this investigation, in October 1919 he also joined as a student 
the Faculty of Law in Iaşi whose dean was none other than his godfather, 
A.C. Cuza, professor of political economy and a blatant anti-Semite.160 After 
his brief engagement with the short-lived Guard of National Awareness as a 
political activist, the then young student of law became involved in university 
politics. As the leader of the Students of Law association he would promote a 
program of extracurricular anti-Semitism,161 defend the numerus clausus 
chauvinistic movement, exert violence against his Jewish colleagues and over-
all disturb academics and students alike.162 By a decision of the Senate of the 
154) Ibid., 351.
155) Ibid., 350.
156) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 265; Codreanu, Pentru legionari, 5; Iordachi, ‘God’s 
Chosen Warriors,’ 338.
157) Iordachi, ‘God’s Chosen Warriors,’ 339.
158) Ibid., 333-336, 334
159) Ibid., 334
160) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 265; Codreanu, Pentru legionari, 9.
161) Codreanu, Pentru legionari, 28.
162) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 266.
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university, he was expelled, but the Faculty of Law refused to comply with this 
decision and chose not to be represented in the Senate anymore. As Codreanu 
noted, his benefactors – in the person of the same A.C. Cuza, the dean of the 
Faculty, and of Matei B. Cantacuzino, a still highly regarded professor of civil 
law – took great care of him by opposing the Senate and thus defending their 
ultra-nationalist creeds.163 At the time of the graduation, the military-trained 
student’s award of the diploma was refused by the university and he would 
practice as a lawyer on the basis of a certificate delivered by the Faculty.164
If the post-war political landscape is placed under the sign of revolutionary 
and counter-revolutionary turmoil, legal life itself follows this trend. The state 
of siege is the most prominent case of this new sense of uncertainty, but not 
the only one. Public trials, such as in the case of the senate plot, or that of the 
ringleaders of the Tatar Bunary uprising165 bear witness for a public concern 
with the functioning legal institutions and the administration of justice. In this 
context, following the foundation of the National-Christian League under the 
leadership of A.C. Cuza and militating against the constitution which granted 
full citizenship to the Jewish population, Codreanu and his followers were 
imprisoned for conspiring to assassinate members of the government – 
amongst which was also Gheorghe Mârzescu who orchestrated the repression 
of the strike in 1918.166 He would soon be acquitted, as the legislation of the 
time did not criminalize preparatory acts to a crime, but only attempts.167 
After the experience of imprisonment and drifting away from the former allies, 
Codreanu put the basis of a youth organization still associated with the League, 
for the time being, under the name of Frăția de cruce [The Brotherhood of the 
Cross].168 Following a conflict with the local chief of police in Iaşi, Codreanu 
killed the latter in the building of the Magistrate’s Court in Iaşi, during the 
proceedings of a trial in which he acted as a lawyer. After a trial under the regu-
lar procedure before a jury in Turnu Severin, Codreanu was freed on the basis 
of having acted in self-defense. He then moved to France to resume his studies 
within a doctoral programme in political economy in Grenoble. Upon his 
return, in 1927, Codreanu built on the basis of the Brotherhood, the Legion 
of Archangel Michael.169
163) Codreanu, Pentru legionari, 27.
164) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 267.
165) See, e.g., Constantin Costa-Foru, Abuzurile și crimele Siguranței generale a Statului 
(Bucharest: Tipografia Triumful, 1925).
166) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 266.
167) Ibid. During the trial, Ioan Moţa, one of the leading figures of the emerging movement, 
would shoot a former member who had been exposed as an informer. He will be soon acquit-
ted for self-defense.
168) Ibid. See also Mann, Fascists, 265.
169) Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right, 267-268.
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173) Haynes, ‘Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian “New Man”,’ 176.
174) Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Cărticica șefului de cuib (Bucharest: Tipografia C.S.M.C., 
1940), 47.
In the early days of the trade union based Guard of National Awareness, 
Romanian ultranationalists would pledge allegiance to the King and country, 
seeing themselves as a force of defence against international communism.170 
In this sense, they advocated for a socialist order which should have benefitted 
only Romanians, the other ‘foreign elements’ being excluded from the com-
munity. It is also important to note, that Codreanu identified the communist 
movement as a threat to the legal order itself, which he pledged to protect.171 
The actions of breaking the strikes, the alleged support and proven leniency 
Averescu’s government had for this emerging movement as well as Vaida-
Voievod’s later support172 clearly define the movement as an agent of the state 
of siege, a force which was not regulated by law, but which aimed at protecting 
the existing status-quo.
Later actions are more complex and relate to the inner ideological drives of 
the Romanian ultranationalists. The movement’s pledge to deal with the work-
ers’ and peasants’ problems without any form of political mediation, their later 
attempts to create a legionary commerce which they boasted to be equally 
equitable and devoid of ‘Jewishness’,173 all point towards a form of subtraction 
from the authority of the state and the eventual the creation of a parallel state. 
The later moves, such as participation into parliamentary elections and the pro-
fession of political violence against representatives of the authorities are para-
doxical inasmuch as they recognize the basic form of the political nomos while 
they deny its concrete instantiations. This paradox could not be pointed out 
better than in the movement’s creed stated by Codreanu himself. In his own 
words, ‘I believe in a new Romania, which we want to vanquish through Christ’s 
Church and integral nationalism, according to the laws of the country’.174
What is striking at this point is the reference to the movement conceived as 
a lawful entity, acting for the protection of the legal order and the laws of the 
land. Acts of violence as well as perpetration of crimes would be constantly 
followed by a recognition of the state authority as long as members of the 
movement, either would be freed by legal means, or would turn themselves to 
justice. It is in this sense, that the whole ultra-nationalist movement can 
be related not only to the state of siege reigning over Romania since the times 
of the First World War up until 1928, but also to the more general state of 
exception which governed the status of the legal sphere as such. By education 
a military man and a lawyer as well, Codreanu is the product of a legal culture 
under the strain of the excess specific to the post-World War.
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(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 19-53.
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180) Ornea,The Romanian Extreme Right, 271-73.
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182) Agamben, State of exception, 41-42.
The mythical or phantasmatic origins of the movement gravitate not only 
along a religious reference and a language of palingenesis, but also along a 
vocabulary and a practice of secrecy and a poetics if not a mystique of ritual-
ized oaths of allegiance. From the oath in the forests of Moldavia opening the 
autobiography of the leader,175 to the oaths at graduation,176 to the later rituals 
of the entry into the Legion,177 the history of Romanian ultranationalism is 
filled with rites of passage and sacralized forms of conspiracy. The foundation 
of the movement on secrecy and on the charisma of the leader178 points 
towards an inherent opposition to the ostensible characteristics of modern 
law which privileges transparency and rationality. The Legion would eventu-
ally become thus a ‘secret society in broad daylight’,179 one which was strongly 
connected both to the military rituals and the underside of the law. Indeed, the 
Legion in its violent form had very much in common with the figure of the 
great criminal both rhetorically180 and structurally as the violence it exerts 
threatens the law preserving violence of the state.181
However, even if Romanian fascism draws on this trope, it cannot be 
reduced to it. As the state of siege has cut through the symbolic level of the 
politico-juridical landscape by blurring the essential categories of peace, war 
and citizenship, the ultranationalists’ position thus benefitted from the new 
configuration. For as the state of exception entails confusion between fact and 
norm, the possibility to distinguish between state-sanctioned violence and 
violence exacted in the name of the state is also minimized. As the state is 
deemed to be under threat and in such times, the law rests in the body politic 
of the citizens,182 the Legion acts not as a movement directed against the law, 
but as an excrescence of the mechanism brought in by the state of exception. 
It is thus both para-military and para-legal in the most basic sense, as it consid-
ers itself as an agent of the law.
Conclusion
Fascist calls for a Romania for Romanians, the Legion’s counter-revolutionary 
pledges, its anti-Semitism and anti-Communism are thus forms of a military 
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logic which constantly creates enemies out of the body politic of the nation 
itself. It is useful at this point to turn towards a Foucauldian standpoint and to 
ask to which extent the return of the old forms of sovereignty, that is of the 
assertions of the power over life, is inextricably linked to the emergence of 
modern biopolitical governmentality itself.183 The racism professed by the 
members of the fascist movement is not a novel creation, but a symptom of a 
general political tension between the universal promises of modern constitu-
tionalism and the counter-discourses of nationalist ideology undermining it. 
Accordingly, the fascist movement places itself in a tradition of Romanian cul-
tural and political nationalism which emerged out of the tensed equation 
between revolution and Nation already apparent in the complex network of 
events leading to the birth of the Romanian state.
While driving itself against the postulates of the constitution, the Legion 
did not profess a radical reconsideration of the existing politico-legal nomos. 
Rather, what it was defending was precisely the old order and the gamut of 
titles of an imagined ancien régime. It was defending the ‘true’ mythical law 
which has been disrupted by the emergence of modernity. As such, it reasserts 
the already existent anxiety amongst Romanian lawyers. For as none other 
than Constantin Disescu wrote in his younger days, ‘when a people abandons 
its national institutions in order to replace them by foreign institutions, it sup-
presses its own vital germs’.184 There might be as well at work a legal palin-
genetic thrust to the appeal to the higher law of the country, to the opposition 
to the foreign bourgeois institutions borrowed from France which are part of 
the fascist discourse.185 But this opposition stays secondary as the revolution-
ary pledges would also do. For the Romanian ultranationalist passage à l’acte 
originates in the suspension of the law, is complicit with the status quo, and it 
places itself on the side of violence underlying the legal system. It springs up 
from the powers of the myth; it is mythical violence which ‘demands sacrifice’ 
and which sustains the law.186
To be sure, the trajectory of the Legion in relation to the constituted power 
is not one-dimensional. The original stand of the movement on the ‘right’ 
side of the law and its positioning as a defender of the order changed through 
time. The Legion thus shifted status from a vigilante organization to that of 
an outlaw group and to that of a political party through the 1930s. The ideologi-
cal tenets of the movement also became more radical and to some extent 
even more refined especially through the cooption of the intelligentsia and 
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the  fascination it exerted over intellectual figures during this later stage. 
Whether this change took the forms of a dramatic alteration able to deal 
away with the ideological creeds of its initial trajectory is in itself a subject of 
inquiry. Additionally, the relation lawyers – theorists and practitioners alike – 
entertained with the movement, as well as the overall tendency of ‘revolution-
izing’ legal thought and practice need to be further explored in order to situate 
the movement in relation with constituted power. What should become clearer 
at the end of this intervention is the multifaceted relation Romanian fascist 
movement kept with a legal framework already caught in a crisis of meaning 
which goes beyond the fascist moment. This should suffice to make at least 
difficult to attribute a clear-cut authentic revolutionary thrust to Romanian 
fascism. Consequently, an analysis of other fascist movements through a criti-
cal exploration of their respective legal landscape could shed new lights on 
their ideological trajectory and also contribute to an archaeology of the darker 
legacies of law.
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